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 Abstract 
Humanitarians are no longer simply seen as selfless angels. Their motivations and 
mastery, their principles and products are questioned from within and from without. 
Understanding the ongoing transformations in contemporary humanitarianism requires 
examining the nature and evolution of humanitarian culture away from an agreed 
culture of cooperation to a contested one of competition. The latter reflects 
militarization, politicization, and marketization. What is required is a learning culture 
for practitioners and a consequentialist ethics more oriented to responsible reflection 
than rapid reaction. 
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Humanitarianism’s Contested Culture in War 
Zones 
 
Thomas G. Weiss** 
 
Humanitarian action in war zones was never easy but has proved especially 
daunting in the post-Cold War era. Although there never was a golden age, David 
Rieff and others nostalgically lament today’s ‘humanitarianism in crisis’ (Rieff 2002). 
This is hardly a ‘mid-life’ version, however, because most observers date the birth 
from the mid-nineteenth-century creation of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) (Forsythe 2005; Barnett 2011). Whatever the vintage and Steven 
Pinker (2011) notwithstanding, humanitarians no longer are necessarily on the side 
of the angels—their motivations and mastery, their principles and products are 
questioned from within and from without. 
Understanding the ongoing transformations in contemporary humanitarianism 
requires examining the nature and evolution of humanitarian culture—its values, 
language, behavior. This essay begins with the dominant traditional one as a metric 
to explore the move away from an agreed culture of cooperation to a contested 
one of competition as a result of militarization, politicization, and marketization. It 
concludes with a plea for a ‘learning culture’ oriented to responsible reflection 
rather than rapid reaction. 
The Dominant Culture, the Good Samaritan 
The ‘H’ word is rooted in morality and principle—the parable of the ‘Good 
Samaritan’ often comes to mind. The objective is noble, to help vulnerable 
populations, irrespective of who they are, where they are located, or why they are 
needy. Aid agencies are interested in the welfare of those in their care and 
unaffected by political and market factors in the countries that provide or receive 
assistance. Humanitarian action consists of delivering life-saving emergency relief 
to and protecting the fundamental human rights of endangered people. Both tasks 
are meant to catch in the global safety net individuals trapped in the vortex of 
human-made disasters. The two tasks are supposed to be mutually reinforcing 
                                                          
 ** Thomas G. Weiss is Presidential Professor at The Graduate Center of The City University of 
New York and Director Emeritus of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, and 
Research Professor at SOAS, University of London. His previous professional assignments 
included being research director of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty. His recent authored books with relevance for this essay include Humanitarian 
Business (2013); Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action (2012); and Humanitarianism 
Contested: Where Angels Fear to Tread (2011). Two recent co-edited books are The 
International Politics of Human Rights: Rallying to the R2P Cause? (2014) and The Responsibility 
to Protect: Cultural Perspectives in the Global South (2011). 
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although many humanitarians specialize and try to insulate one from the other lest 
by making life-saving succor subservient, emergency relief is held hostage to 
human rights. 
The very word ‘humanitarian’ retains great resonance, but one searches in vain 
for an unequivocal definition. Provided an opportunity in the Nicaragua v United 
States case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) waffled. It stated that 
humanitarian action is what the ICRC does—by inference the independent, neutral, 
and impartial provision of relief to victims of armed conflicts and natural disasters. 
The Oxford English Dictionary—whose 1819 edition had the first citation—uses 
tautologies: humanitarian is ‘having regard to the interests of humanity or mankind 
at large; relating to, or advocating, or practising humanity or human action.’ In 
common discourse, humanitarianism (noun) consists of actions to improve well-
being or welfare; a humanitarian (noun) is a person who actively promotes such 
improvements; and humanitarian (adjective) usually means philanthropic or 
charitable. 
The ICJ’s definition requires parsing the ICRC‘s gold standard.  The politics of 
helping when a natural disaster strikes are relatively simple because every country, 
no matter how sophisticated, can encounter a disaster resembling the 2011 
tsunami and Fukushima nuclear meltdown; and it would be peculiar to decline 
outside help. Asking for assistance in the midst of wars is another matter, however, 
far more fraught. Governments in the throes of armed conflict—especially in civil 
wars—often view help as an all-too-visible indication of weakness. Moreover, aid 
and protection represent fungible resources that are part of the calculations of 
winning a war, and belligerents are not averse to manipulating assistance and 
civilian lives as part of their arsenals. 
The ICRC occupies an unusual position and customarily is treated as sui generis. It 
is the oldest international humanitarian organization and the largest outside the 
UN system. A private organization with a board of governors of prominent Swiss 
citizens, the ICRC resembles nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in that it 
receives both private and public contributions. However, governments provide 90 
percent of its annual budget, about $ 1.2 billion, to cover some 11,000 staff in 80 
countries. Nonetheless, it occupies a category by itself as the custodian of the 
Geneva Conventions—it is a hybrid, neither an intergovernmental organization 
(IGO) nor an NGO.   
Unlike most humanitarian agencies, the ICRC has elaborated core principles, and 
its disciplined staff is committed—always on paper, and often in reality—to 
respecting them. Unlike most NGOs and IGOs that mount a range of activities from 
relief to reconstruction and development, the ICRC works only in active war zones. 
The ICRC’s ground rules focus on what humanitarianism is supposed to do, and how 
it is supposed to do it. In his famous desiderata, Jean Pictet (1979) identified seven 
defining principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary 
service, unity, and universality.1   
The first four arguably constitute the core. Humanity (or human dignity) is 
uncontested and commands attention from all whereas the other three key 
principles are debatable and debated. Impartiality requires that assistance be 
based on need and not discriminate on the basis of nationality, race, religion, 
                                                          
 1 See Weiss 1999: 1–22.   
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gender, or political affiliation. Neutrality demands that humanitarian organizations 
refrain from taking part in hostilities or any action that either benefits or 
disadvantages belligerents. Independence necessitates that assistance not be 
connected to any party with a stake in the outcome of a war; accordingly, there is a 
general rule to refuse or limit reliance on government funding from those with 
interests in the outcome.    
The ICRC derived these principles based on decades of practical experience with 
what works best. Although many observers now treat them as sacrosanct—indeed, 
the essence of humanitarian culture—these principles began as pragmatic 
judgments. Simply put, traditional principles helped guide humanitarians to reach 
people under duress in inter-state conflicts and natural disasters. If aid agencies are 
perceived by combatants as allied with the opposing side, or having a vested 
interest in the outcome, they have difficulty in getting access; or they may become 
targets. If principles are religiously respected, so the argument goes, both aid 
workers and recipients benefit from a sanctuary. Operating according to these 
principles and being perceived as apolitical has been crucial during wars.   
In short, the culture of humanitarianism reflects the desire and ability to provide 
life-saving assistance while honoring neutrality, impartiality, and independence. 
But how pertinent is that tradition in today’s war-torn societies? Remaining above 
the fray and respecting principles is virtually impossible in the face of rampant 
militarization, politicization, and marketization. The questionable relevance of 
traditional humanitarian culture in many contemporary contexts requires that we 
revisit their impact on humanitarianism’s SOPs (standard operating ‘principles’ or 
‘procedures’). 
Militarization 
The routine involvement by third-party military forces in humanitarian efforts is a 
remarkable phenomenon of the post-Cold War era—especially for Africa where 
three-quarters of UN or UN-authorized forces are deployed (Center on 
International Cooperation 2013; Adebajo 2011). Yet using military forces for such 
purposes is not new because a quantum expansion took place after World War II, 
when occupying Germany and Japan as well as reconstructing their economies 
required new types of personnel within the armed forces: administrators, planners, 
and logisticians. The military often possess a cornucopia of resources in the 
shortest supply when disaster strikes: transport, fuel, communications, 
commodities, building equipment, medicines, and provisions. The military’s ‘can-do’ 
mentality, self-supporting character, rapid-response capabilities, and hierarchical 
discipline are assets amidst catastrophic turmoil.  Most dramatically, humanitarian 
benefits can result from the military’s direct exercise of its primary war-fighting 
functions and superior force to overwhelm hostile forces. Such deployments should 
be distinguished from those after natural disasters or in tandem with traditional 
peacekeepers. Military humanitarians can gain access to suffering civilians when 
insecurity makes it impossible or highly dangerous, and they can foster a secure-
enough environment to permit succor and protection by others. Such interveners 
can also change the regime responsible for suffering, admittedly a more contested 
outcome of their efforts.  
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Militarization has proved problematic for humanitarians, and critics have 
lambasted the security function.  They view ‘humanitarian intervention’ or 
‘humanitarian war’ or especially the ‘humanitarian bombing’ of Kosovo or Libya as 
an oxymoron (Roberts 1993; Rieff 2002; see also Bass 2008). Moreover, the use of 
the military to do what only military can do—provide security—complicates 
protection and delivery by civilian organizations because the military dominates 
priority-setting. ‘Humanitarian intervention’ is truth-in-packaging that preceded 
and perhaps more accurately depicts military humanitarianism than the more 
recent and politically palatable ‘responsibility to protect.’2 Adam Roberts (2002) is 
clear: ‘coercive action by one or more states involving the use of armed force in 
another state without the consent of its authorities, and with the purpose of 
preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants.’ Military 
interventions with substantial humanitarian justifications—against the wishes of a 
government, or without their genuine consent—figure prominently in the post-
Cold War era and make action possible in areas where it previously had not been. 
Intervention is not involved when an action is based on a freely given request 
from, or with the unqualified consent of, a state.  All foreign policy aims to 
persuade or cajole other states to change behavior. The absence of consent is 
required to merit the label ‘intervention’ because otherwise any outside 
involvement or attempt to influence another political authority would constitute 
intervention. If it covers everything, the term loses salience. In a world of 
asymmetrical power, what constitutes genuine ‘consent’ also may be questionable.  
Nonetheless, consent has a distinct international legal character; and its expression 
is a conceptual distinction for military measures against a state as well as for 
political and economic sanctions, arms embargoes, and international criminal 
prosecution.  
Consent is an essential building block in the foundations of traditional 
humanitarian culture, but militarization removes it. Humanitarians cannot be 
independent when they rely on the military and its priorities; and coercion requires 
taking sides, thereby robbing neutrality and impartiality of meaning. 
Politicization 
The use of the military anywhere reflects high politics, of course. However, the 
last quarter-century has witnessed a witches’ brew of intensely politicized 
decisions that have substantially altered humanitarian culture. There are four 
ingredients in the recipe.  
The first is the switch from inter-state to intra-stare armed conflict. Civil wars are 
transformative for the culture because humanitarians are no longer dealing with 
authorities of separate governments but a host of armed belligerents. Advanced by 
such scholars as Mary Kaldor (1999) and Mark Duffield (2001) as well as by such 
journalists as Robert Kaplan (2000), the catchy moniker of ‘new wars’ can lead to 
                                                          
 2 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001. Interpretations by 
commissioners are Evans 2008; and Thakur 2006. See also Bellamy 2009; Orford 2011; and 
Hehir 2012. The author’s interpretation is Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action, 2nd 
edition, 2012. 
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confusion. It is less that totally new elements have appeared than elements 
thought extinct or tangential have come to the fore or been combined in ways that 
were heretofore unremarkable (Newman 2004; Kalyvas 2001). Hence, change often 
is so quantitatively high, or the elements are combined in such previously 
unfamiliar ways, that numerous wars effectively merit the shorthand ‘new’ (see 
Hoffman and Weiss 2006).  
Many countries have central governments whose existence takes the form of UN 
membership and control of the capital city or the main exports. They scarcely 
resemble their stable Westphalian counterparts (see Badie 2000). They exercise 
little or no authoritative control over populations and resources; and they certainly 
do not have a monopoly of the use force. Such states suffer from the ‘unbundling’ 
of territory from authority—a negation of the exclusive authority as states (Ruggie 
1993: 165). Drug-crazed child soldiers who hack off the limbs of terrorized civilians 
in Sierra Leone capture some of the horror, as does seeking agreement from the 
forty or so ‘main’ armed opposition movements in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC). ‘Weak’ and ‘failed’ and ‘fragile’ states—various observers have 
preferences and problems with all the adjectives, but the reality is clear—are the 
scene for most contemporary humanitarian action. Traditional humanitarian culture 
has meant the continued application of tactics that worked well in the past for 
interstate armed conflicts but are less useful in today’s civil wars. Neither 
organized violence nor humanitarianism is any longer beholden only or even mainly 
to state authorities, and the de-institutionalization of sovereign central authority 
means a diminished impact of international humanitarian law. 
The second manifestation of politicization is that government donors have 
moved away from investing in untied multilateral disbursements through the UN 
system—especially through the big three of the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF, and the World Food Programme 
(WFP)—toward tying resources to particular groups or conflicts, particular 
agencies, or particular priorities. Bilateral or collective European assistance is more 
vulnerable to politicization than is UN or NGO assistance. With the end of the Cold 
War, bilateral aid agencies increasingly provided resources to IGOs and NGOs, but 
that did not mean the disappearance of political concerns by governments. Donors 
are not bashful about exercising control over funds channeled through 
intergovernmental and nongovernmental agencies. Earmarking is clearly 
manipulation, and the priority of donor agendas is hardly subtler within agencies 
that depend on voluntary funding because the power of the purse is correlated 
with enhanced power in decision making.   
Instead of setting the agenda as the independence of the traditional culture 
would dictate, aid agencies often are sub-contractors for donors whose 
preferences are clear and affect the bottom line whereas those of recipients are 
tough to gauge and can be less consequential for the resource base (Hammond 
2008). Particular donor countries can apply leverage and dictate either to a 
multilateral organization how money should be spent, or how it should be 
subcontracted to local or international NGOs; they have geopolitical interests to 
protect and domestic constituencies to satisfy. Providing a Volvo to a recipient of 
Swedish aid is easier than a Toyota or Ford; channeling resources to favored 
locales, belligerents, or target audiences is an easier sell than unrestricted grants.  
Only the naïve would ignore the tune and the preferences of donors that pay the 
piper.  
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The shift away from unrestricted multilateral toward bilateral aid as well as away 
from untied (or core) grants to multilateral organizations toward earmarking or 
multi-bi grants is unsettling for humanitarians  (Barnett and Snyder 2008). In 1988 
states provided roughly 45 percent of humanitarian assistance through UN 
agencies (Randel and German 2002: 21);  and over the last five years about 50 
percent of such aid was disbursed through multilateral organizations (Global 
Humanitarian Assistance Report 2013: 6).3 As most aid is earmarked for specific 
crises, only a small percentage can be used wherever a multilateral agency 
wishes—the last time such a figure was calculated, it was about 11 percent, or 
some $913 million of multilateral funds in the total of $8.7 billion in 2007’s 
humanitarian contributions from countries members of the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) (GHA 2009: 8).  
Whereas multilateral funding once permitted greater flexibility to pursue agency-
determined priorities, it is now customarily tied to specific activities or locations 
identified by funders even when channeled through multilateral and 
nongovernmental organizations. The shorthand ‘bilateralization’ essentially means 
earmarking or coopting multilateralism as government donors unabashedly pursue 
more compatibility between their contributions and national priorities. Figures vary 
by agency, but UNDP’s core budget is now around 20 percent and the UN’s own 
development activities about 30 percent, a mirror image of twenty years earlier 
when untied resources were by far the norm (Weinlich 2014). While some argue 
that little harm is done by tying aid to such internationally agreed goals at the 
Millennium Development Goals and the UN’s Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) 
(Jenks, forthcoming 2015), programming is increasingly linked to donor- rather 
than agency-determined priorities; and risk-taking and experimentation are 
virtually excluded under such conditionality.  
Accordingly, the needs of affected populations may be secondary in determining 
allocations and programs. For instance, of the top 50 recipients of bilateral 
assistance between 1996 and 1999, the states of the former Yugoslavia, 
Israel/Palestine, and Iraq received half of available resources (Randel and German 
2002: 27). By contrast in 2000, the DRC ranked as the country with the lowest level 
of needs met—a mere 17.2 percent of its CAP; four years later it was Zimbabwe at 
14.2 percent.  In 2012 the total shortfall was $3.3 billion with only 63 percent of 
identified needs met—Zimbabwe the highest at 86 percent of unmet needs and 
Liberia the lowest at 38 percent (GHA 2013: 5). The impact of 9/11 already was 
obvious in 2002 as nearly half of all funds given by donor governments to the UN’s 
25 appeals went to Afghanistan (Smillie and Minear 2004: 145; Oxfam 2003: 2). A 
decade later, the appeal for Afghanistan remained among the best-funded in 
proportion to estimated requirements. Unsurprisingly, in the wake of the 2011 
intervention that ousted Muammar el-Gaddafi, Libya immediately assumed a 
position among the better-funded CAPs while Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Haiti rounded 
out the top five. The most underfunded included the countries of West Africa, 
Zimbabwe, and Djibouti (OCHA 2011: 13). By 2012, Pakistan, Somalia, and the 
Occupied Territories headed the list (GHA 2013: 6). 
                                                          
 3 Hereafter GHA 2013, available at http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/07/GHA-Report-20131.pdf. 
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There is virtually no difference between the motivations of Western and non-
traditional donors; geopolitics often trumps humanitarian values. For instance, non-
DAC humanitarian funds increased dramatically from 2011 to 2012 as Turkey 
almost doubled its contribution—most going to its neighbor Syria, which accounted 
for half a million refugees in the host country and disruption of Turkey’s economy 
and domestic politics (GHA 2013: 4, 36). 
The third factor in increased politicization results from the policies of 
humanitarian agencies, which have decided that band-aides are insufficient, that 
they should alleviate the causes of suffering by addressing poverty and human 
rights. The shift from emergency relief to attacking root causes and post-conflict 
peace-building is ambitious.  No longer satisfied with saving individuals today to 
place them in jeopardy tomorrow—the infamous ‘well-fed dead’ is a memorable 
framing about aid in the former Yugoslavia4—many humanitarians now aspire to 
nothing less than improving the structural conditions that endanger vulnerable 
populations.  Their help also should somehow be supportive of negotiations and 
peace processes. Rather than applying salve, they wish to use assistance and 
protection to spread development, democracy, and human rights and to create 
stable, effective, and legitimate states (Donini 2004; Fox 2001). 
Neutrality and impartiality can be obstacles to promoting human rights.  Reciting 
the humanitarian mantra is of little avail; traditional principles provide no or even 
bad guidance. As David Rieff (2011: 254) tells us, ‘humanitarian space is a 
sentimental idea, neutrality a bogus one, and impartiality an abstraction…The 
sooner they are given a decent burial, the sooner we can all move on.’ 
The fourth factor is post-9/11 politics. Since the attacks on the United States in 
September 2001, many countries have viewed counter-terrorism and 
humanitarianism as crime-fighting partners—with conflict-prone states as 
sanctuaries and staging platforms for terrorists. Humanitarian organizations, in this 
view, are part of wider ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns, attempting to convince local 
populations of the goodness of armies invading in the name of stability and 
freedom. US secretary of state Colin Powell (2001) told a gathering of private aid 
agencies that ‘just as surely as our diplomats and military, American NGOs are out 
there [in Afghanistan] serving and sacrificing on the frontlines of freedom. NGOs 
are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team.’  
Whether or not humanitarians are opposed to elements of Western, and especially 
US, foreign policy, in the field they often are perceived as supporters.  
In a related fashion, governments have discovered that humanitarian action could 
be instrumental in postponing or avoiding more costly political decisions and 
actions, a ‘humanitarian alibi.’ UN high commissioner for refugees Sadako Ogata 
(2005: 25), for one, became an outspoken opponent of such contrivances: ‘There 
are no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems.’ The major powers 
authorized UNHCR to deliver relief in Bosnia in part because they wanted to relieve 
the growing pressure for a military intervention. Yet to the extent that aid became 
a substitute for politics and a sop to hopeful publics, according to Alex de Waal 
(2001: 221), it led ‘Western governments and donating publics to be deluded into 
believing the fairy tale that their aid can solve profound political problems, when it 
cannot.’ 
                                                          
 4 Fred Cuny’s phrase was popularized by Cohen and Deng (1998a: 10; 1998b: 15).  
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Marketization Part 1: Outsiders in the 
Humanitarian Business 
‘Humanitarian’ and ‘business’ are juxtaposed for two reasons: provocation and 
accuracy (Weiss 2013). Jarring for those who idealize the humanitarian enterprise, 
the adjective has essentially uncontested positive connotations while the noun 
usually is associated with wheeling and dealing and at odds with the values and 
self-image of true-believers. If humanitarian action claims the moral high ground, 
business is customarily seen to occupy less lofty territory. In contrast to 
humanitarians, those in the market operate where deals are cut, money buys 
access, the common good is ignored, talk is cheap, and decisions about profit 
margins ignore human costs.   
Of course, outside humanitarians coming to the rescue and, in Nicholas Wheeler’s 
words, ‘saving strangers’ (Wheeler 2000) are not divorced from but rather steeped 
in politics; and they operate in the marketplace. The day-to-day functioning of all 
aid agencies intersects in myriad ways with home and host governments, with 
armed forces and armed insurgents as well as military peacekeepers and local 
populations; and most crucially, it confronts the priorities of funders. As agents 
engaged in resource acquisition and distribution, where they get their resources 
and how and to whom they deliver relief can have significant consequences on aid 
personnel in headquarters and in war zones. Staff cannot ignore bottom-lines; they 
are not apolitical. 
The Good Samaritan characterizes the aspirations and expectations of numerous 
aid workers. This idealistic embrace is understandable because humanitarian 
organizations are required to project this image to Western publics as part of a 
marketing logic: contributions emanate from donors whose heart-strings and 
purse-strings are tugged in tandem with a story and image of a single suffering 
child (two reduce the dramatic effect) caught in the crosshairs of war who can only 
be saved by generous donations. Contributors want to be assured that their inputs 
are directly helping to improve lives. Fund-raising brochures depict relief workers 
wearing T-shirts with a recognizable logo posing beside seemingly happier and 
better-nourished kids. 
Like entrepreneurs, humanitarians are concerned with image and marketing in an 
expanding and competitive global business in which suppliers vie for market 
shares. While funding is more abundant than ever, resources are still ‘scarce’ in light 
of the magnitude of the needs—as indicated, less than two-thirds of such needs 
were met in the most recent year for which data are available. For die-hard 
humanitarians who claim to be apolitical and are offended by the allegation that 
they are not, the term ‘business’ will unsettle.  True-believers will be uneasy about 
being analyzed as part of a marketplace because marketing involves four ‘P’s’: 
product, price, place, and promotion. Yet the entire business, as Hugo Slim (2012) 
writes, begins with ‘selling the idea of restraint and compassion in war.’ 
Marketization in the globalizing world of the twenty-first century means that 
everything has a price—from access, to moral authority, to lives.  
Institutional innovations usually occur after wars when conscience-shocking 
horrors expose the inadequacies of existing response mechanisms. Henri Dunant’s 
revulsion with Solferino’s carnage led to creating the ICRC in 1865. The bloody 
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aftermath of World War I and the Russian Revolution led to founding the 
International Office for Refugees and Save the Children. Similarly, World War II led 
to a host of agencies—Oxfam, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, and CARE 
along with members of the UN family, including UNICEF and UNHCR. The French 
Doctors Movement—beginning with Médecins sans Frontières (MSF)—emerged 
when dissident staff revolted against ICRC’s dysfunctional orthodoxy during the 
Nigeria-Biafra War.  
The end of the Cold War resulted in no transformation of international law or 
institutions but rather new conflicts and crises, along with the eruption of long-
simmering ones held in check during the era of acute East-West tensions; and it 
also resulted in the proliferation of humanitarian agencies and opening resource 
floodgates. The budgets of humanitarian organizations had a five-fold increase 
from about $800 million in 1989 to some $4.4 billion in 1999, with an additional 
quadrupling to $16.7 billion in 2009—after peaking at just over $20 billion in 2010, 
the figures drifted downward to $19.4 billion in 2011 and $17.9 billion in 2012 (the 
last year for which data are available) (GHA 2013: 4). Some individual agencies (like 
the International Rescue Committee) or federations (like Oxfam and Save the 
Children) are big enterprises while others are smaller, many even artisanal. While 
the number of UN organizations has not grown, their budgets have (accounting for 
about two-thirds of total DAC humanitarian disbursements). At least 2,500 
international NGOs are in the business even if only a tenth of them are truly 
significant. There could be 37,000 international NGOs with some relevance for 
what Linda Polman (2010) calls ‘the crisis caravan.’ On average a bevy of some 
1,000 international and local NGOs flocks to a contemporary emergency.   
Over the past decade, governments have disbursed some $110 billion for 
humanitarian assistance. In 2010 and 2011, they provided some $14 billion per year 
and almost $13 billion in 2012; and private voluntary contributions reached a peak 
of $6.3 billion in 2010 (roughly $5 billion in 2012), up from $3.0 billion in 2007 (GHA 
2013: 20, 30). Moreover over the last half-decade UN peace operations have added 
between $8 and $10 billion annually, with most soldiers deployed in the same 
target countries. More and more governments are responding to disasters of all 
sorts, and the numbers have expanded beyond the West to the Rest. Whereas 16 
states pledged their support to Bosnia in the mid-1990s, mostly from the West, a 
diverse group of 73 attended the 2003 pledging conference in Madrid for Iraq, and 
92 responded to the December 2004 tsunami. While OECD governments almost 
doubled their assistance between 2000 and 2010 from $6.7 billion to $11.8 billion, 
non-OECD governments increased their contributions from $35 million to $623 
million—an 18-fold increase, albeit from a much lower base. In 2011 and 2012, DAC 
donors decreased from $13 to $11.6 billion whereas non-DAC donors increased 
from $.8 to $1.4 billion (GHA 2013: 4). 
What about the number of aid workers worldwide? Abby Stoddard and colleagues 
hazard a guess of over 200,000 (Stoddard, Harmer, and Haver 2006). But Peter 
Walker and Catherine Russ are undoubtedly closer to the mark: ‘We have no idea 
what size this population is.’ Estimates include everyone from cleaning personnel 
and drivers in field offices to CEOs in headquarters. Walker and Russ extrapolate 
from Oxfam data and estimate some 30,000 humanitarian professionals (both local 
and expatriate) worldwide (Walker and Russ 2010). 
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One need not agree with Naomi Klein’s (2007) characterization of the business 
model for emergency relief as ‘disaster capitalism’ to appreciate the extent to 
which the global bottom-lines of some $18–20 billion in recent years with 
personnel spread across the planet helping 75–100 million people would, on the 
face of it, strike most observers as a substantial business. The culture of 
humanitarian cooperation has been replaced by one of humanitarian competition. 
James Ron and Alexander Cooley point to ‘the scramble’ for resources, which 
channels the priorities and programs for humanitarian agencies—public and 
private, large and small, religious and secular. The result is a ‘contract culture’ 
among outsiders that is ‘deeply corrosive’ of the humanitarian soul (Cooley and Ron 
2002: 13). 
Marketization Part 2: Insiders in War Economies 
The contestation of traditional humanitarian culture also reflects the ugly reality 
of local economies in war-torn and conflict-prone countries. Two kinds of local 
market forces influence contemporary humanitarian culture: economic interests 
that directly profit from armed conflict, and peculiar political economies. 
The idiosyncratic economies of contemporary war zones represent alternative 
ways to make a profit. Carl von Clausewitz’s celebrated dictum that war is the 
continuation of politics was adapted by David Keen (2000: 27): ‘war may be the 
continuation of economics by other means.’5 When states are falling apart or 
putting themselves back together, peculiar opportunities for profit abound. 
Balance sheets have always been important in fueling war, and certainly captains of 
industry from Krupp in the Third Reich to Halliburton in Iraq have been more than 
willing to help the national cause as well as enrich corporate and personal coffers.  
However, the local economy in contemporary wars plays a quantitatively and 
qualitatively different role than previously (Reno 2000: 44–5; Mehlum, Moene, and 
Torvik 2002). There is little production, mainly destruction. The economy and 
society as a whole suffer while isolated individuals benefit. With cash, arms, and 
power flowing into their hands, warring factions have no incentive to proceed to or 
remain at the negotiating table; instead, their interests are served by prolonging 
war and the accompanying economy that is of direct benefit. Local actors can 
concentrate their energies on controlling and illegally or legally exporting a few 
key resources like diamonds or tropical timber. Much spoiler behavior—before, 
during, and after wars—can be explained by perverse economic incentives and 
rewards.  
Conventional international relations theory emphasizes the control of territory as 
essential to maintain authority, but contemporary wars compel actors to 
concentrate their energies on controlling commerce in key commodities. 
Commercial activity in many wars is premised on the continuation of violent 
conflict or is used to fuel it, or both. A form of criminal, distorting, and debilitating 
trade is often the product of the exploitation of natural resources by private 
interests. Sometimes the formal economy of the state is manipulated for private 
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gain, an ‘economy of plunder’ (Hibou 1999: 71, 96). At other times, criminals, 
especially those operating as part of transnational networks, foster the erosion of 
state power to prevent governmental regulation and taxation (Shelly 1995; 
Williams 1994). The opportunities to pursue personal gain and to finance war lead 
many non-state actors to emphasize access to and control over natural resources, 
frequently resulting in heightened violence and humanitarian needs. In short, 
contemporary wars present opportunities for personal enrichment (protection and 
plunder) in addition to the prospects of an infusion of resources from outsiders. 
The latter constitutes the second local economic distortion in today’s wars. The 
provision of external resources designed to help the helpless drives local ‘aid 
economies.’ More violence means more suffering and more aid with more 
opportunities for local profit for the lucky few.  
Unpacking the politics of war-torn societies reveals three problems for aid 
workers within that local marketplace. First, it is virtually impossible not to work 
with ‘spoilers’ (Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002), but humanitarians have to 
pay particular attention to minimize the chances that they may inadvertently 
enhance the legitimacy of illegitimate actors. Formal relations with spoilers 
implicitly acknowledge their authority; and improving their ability to provide relief 
can bolster claims to legitimacy.  
Second, humanitarian aid is fungible and can relieve belligerents of some burdens 
of waging war, effectively increasing their capacity to continue fighting by 
diminishing the demands of governing and cutting the costs of sustaining 
casualties. Perhaps the most significant manifestation of what would usually be 
called ‘corruption,’ but is now labelled the ‘cost of doing humanitarian business,’ 
consists of purchasing access through payments to those who control territory. 
Central government authorities and warlords try to siphon off as large a portion of 
aid supplies as they can. Estimates range from 15 to 80 percent. A 25-30 percent 
‘tax’ seems to be a working average, which was actually the documented figure for 
the share claimed by Indonesian soldiers from the tsunami relief in Aceh, where a 
guerrilla group had been operating; and the figure was comparable throughout the 
former Yugoslavia where the UNHCR regularly surrendered comparable portions to 
Serbian soldiers (Polman 2010: 96–9).  
Third, outside agencies may constitute virtually the entire formal monetized 
sector. International salaries paid regularly in foreign exchange are attractive not 
only to skilled workers, technicians, and those with language skills but also to 
drivers, guards, gardeners, and maids. With remuneration that is 10-to-30 times as 
high as the equivalent position in the local economy, hundreds of applicants appear 
for any vacancy posted by aid agencies. Moreover, hyper-inflation often afflicts the 
economy along with the accompanying costs of prostitution, drugs, counter-band, 
and social mores. Moving from the ‘economics of war’ to the ‘economics of peace’ 
in conflicts like those in Afghanistan and Liberia is, according to Graciana del 
Castillo (2009), perhaps the toughest challenge in post-conflict peacebuilding. 
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Toward an Evidence-Based Culture 
Usually soldiers and humanitarians are seen as different species; in particular, 
their respective cultures emphasize distinct values toward and perspectives on 
violence and the use of force. Although approaching war from differing 
philosophical positions, their respective organizations share at least one 
characteristic: thriving ones learn and adapt. Yet the dominant humanitarian 
culture discounts if not disparages in-depth research. Many aid officials are 
impatient with the culture of inquiry, which they see as the antithesis of their own.6 
Analysis is a luxury, an investment in problem-finding not problem-solving. For the 
most part, humanitarians and their fiduciary boards have neglected or at least 
relegated to a tertiary or even symbolic status within their organizations the tasks 
of formally identifying problems, gathering data, drawing conclusions, and 
translating lessons into new policies and actions—a cumulative process known as 
‘learning.’  
Much experience since the 1990s demonstrates that reactions to crises are 
routine, but serious reflections are too infrequently part of job descriptions. For 
example in his detailed look into UNHCR, Gil Loescher (2001) points to the 
institution’s conservative culture, which is resistant to change and inhospitable to 
the infusion of new ideas and outside criticism. This organizational pathology is not 
a UNHCR monopoly but a widespread malady. 
The value of learning is not necessarily apparent to practitioners if links to 
policies and programs are absent. ‘Adaptation’ occurs when an organization 
identifies short-term modifications to solve problems. But ‘change’ takes place 
after substantial reflections about the premises of particular modalities for 
humanitarian action and the most desirable ways to alter policies, to adapt 
principles, and ultimately to redesign and conduct a subsequent generation of 
operations. ‘Transformation’ refers to profound change.  
While the international humanitarian system certainly has adapted over the 
years, the challenges of new wars and new humanitarianisms are momentous 
enough to necessitate bold changes, even transformations, in strategic thinking 
and acting. However, aid agencies are far more likely to tinker modestly than to 
change substantially let alone to transform dramatically.  
A comparison of military institutions and humanitarian agencies—and their 
respective cultures—is instructive. Critics customarily castigate a hierarchical and 
over-funded military, but the soldierly pursuit of order and discipline is the 
expected result. SOPs reflect an approach to managing and executing tasks under 
centralized authority. One might expect such a culture to be rigid and unreceptive 
to learning. But success and promotion are contingent on flexibility and openness 
to change in strategy and tactics, as well as discipline in carrying out new 
procedures that result from analyzing past successes and failures. And new 
technologies and investments in them are routine. 
Recognizing a need to innovate is not cheap, and significant budgetary resources 
are normally dedicated to evaluation and analysis. National defense occupies a 
privileged position in governmental battles for resources. The potential costs of 
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falling behind—defeat—are high enough to ensure allocations for research, 
training, and investment. The material incentives for the military to succeed on the 
battlefield typically guarantee parliamentary largesse toward budgetary requests. 
There is no question of going out of business, or being second-best. 
The contrast with the culture and expenditures of the vast majority of 
humanitarian organizations could hardly be greater. They normally beg for what 
may be inadequate resources to react and provide relief and protection in war’s 
wake; budgets are not guaranteed but reflect perpetual fund-raising. Aid agencies 
almost always work with other actors. In mobilizing resources, agencies rely on 
donors. In providing relief and protection, their work hinges on access facilitated by 
a host of other agencies, including soldiers. In short, the challenges of fundraising 
and securing access often make humanitarian action contingent on an alignment of 
donor wishes and the whims of interlocutors. Individual aid agencies are essential 
cogs in a much larger international machine. This case is especially evident in the 
non-permissive operational environments of today’s armed conflicts. 
Despite the ever-changing institutional environment and character of different 
war zones, humanitarians have no boot camps or laboratories for experiments to 
help overcome bureaucratic inertia and operational difficulties. Other than an 
occasional master’s program, there are no specialized academies.  And virtually no 
resources, at least as a percentage of overall budgets, are allocated to 
understanding current and previous operations with a view toward changing tactics 
and strategies. Indeed, a virtue has often been made from what in other 
organizations would be seen as a grave shortcoming—namely, moving as quickly as 
possible to the next crisis without having gathered data and digested the evidence 
from the last catastrophe, evaluated it, and attempted to formulate alternative 
policies and approaches. Bragging rights and the highest ratings go to those 
spending the least on training and evaluation and other overhead expenses that 
supposedly indicate waste.  
Why is it so difficult, as the annual report from the International Federation of 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies asked over a decade ago, to exercise 
‘humanitarian judgment to analyze context’ (IFRC 2003: 36)? David Kennedy 
provides the answer: ‘When data are uncertain, humanitarians are guided by 
hunches, inferences, and conceptions of best practice.’ In the rush to respond, 
humanitarians repeat ‘pat answers’ that may have once made sense. But instead of 
mindless repetitions and reactions, hard-headed reflections should guide agencies: 
‘A pragmatism of consequences runs into difficulty when expertise of this type 
substitutes for careful analysis of long- and short-term consequences.’ And the 
humanitarian culture should change because humanitarians ‘tend to be 
uncomfortable thinking of themselves making the kind of distributional choices 
among winners and losers which seem required by a pragmatism of consequences’ 
(Kennedy 2005: xxiii–xxiv). Based on her searing experiences with Médecins sans 
Frontières, Fiona Terry (2002: 44) uses her book’s title to ask an obvious rhetorical 
question: Condemned to Repeat? She and others detail missed opportunities for 
learning since the 1990s, which led Ian Smillie and Larry Minear (2004: 224) to 
recommend ‘a more holistic approach . . . that puts learning at center stage.’ 
Unfortunately, slowing down to reflect is doubly problematic. Not only are too 
few resources devoted to reflection, but the incentive structure rewards those at 
the head of the response queue. Comparing the military’s approach to learning 
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with that of humanitarians results in a gross disparity, the low priority accorded by 
the latter in understanding and adapting to the dynamics impairing effective action 
in  war zones. 
The lack of a learning orientation is structural. Randolph Kent (2004: 9) noted a 
decade ago that ‘Strategy formulation requires at a minimum the involvement of 
all the main components within the organization—in other words, an unusual 
degree of intra-organisational cooperation among those responsible for 
emergencies, policies, development and budgeting.’ Thus, strategizing involves two 
steps: first, learning and adapting behavior; and second, disseminating such 
knowledge and ensuring coherent implementation. For humanitarian strategic 
thinking to become strategic doing, agencies desperately require a program to 
develop and strengthen in-house and system-wide analytical capacities.  
Improvements are necessary throughout the system, but individual agencies 
should begin to develop and nurture three analytical capabilities as part of a 
different humanitarian culture. Better intelligence is the first. A severe obstacle for 
agencies operating in the field or planning future efforts is an absence of timely 
and accurate information (see Stanley Foundation 2003; Weiss and Hoffman 2005). 
Without it, humanitarians can blunder into aiding manipulative parties and 
participating in other counterproductive endeavors. Information about the 
intentions and conduct of actors in a theater can help in selecting tactics, 
negotiating access, and sequencing other aspects of operations that ultimately 
contribute to success. 
Aid agencies often enter theaters without even the most basic knowledge about 
belligerents and the history and dynamics of the area in which violence is raging. 
Not only is such knowledge inadequate, rarer still are personnel devoted to 
monitoring local politics once an operation is underway in order to inform policy- 
and decision-makers. Knowledge of local societies and languages are obvious 
lacunae, and many practitioners have lamented their absence long before the 
standard bill-of-fare became Islamic countries for which Western expertise is in 
especially short supply. But there are less-obvious shortcomings, namely, how 
several sources of humanitarian intelligence—data and analyses of belligerents, 
local conditions, indigenous humanitarian resources, and the impacts of 
assistance—can be developed and utilized. 
The second capacity is not unrelated, namely the need to improve institutional 
memory, to document activities and the resulting repercussions. George 
Santayana’s warning that ‘those who do not know the lessons of history are 
doomed to repeat them’ has too little resonance among humanitarians. What 
business analysts would call a ‘flat learning curve’ characterizes the humanitarian 
enterprise, in which participants compare notes mainly with those who reside in the 
same echo chamber. Understanding the scope and nature of problems and critically 
evaluating options are keys to avoiding previous mistakes and grappling with 
alternatives. Agencies should establish formal documentation and research units. 
Institutional memory could draw on graduate students in history and the social 
sciences for technical support in fact-finding and analysis, a process that could also 
help future recruitment and nourish the next generation of practitioners. 
The third capacity is communications and networking, which should accompany 
improved intelligence and institutional memories to collect and process data for 
those about to enter new positions or theaters. The discussion of the marketplace 
Weiss  |  Humanitarianism’s Contested Culture in War Zones 
 
Global Cooperation Research Papers 8 19 
 
suggested the structural and cultural difficulties in promoting coordination and 
coherence within the international humanitarian system. Completely eliminating 
these tensions is unrealistic, but certainly better communications are more feasible 
and essential for better coordination or even modest coherence. An important step 
in the right direction would be long-term relationships between key research 
institutions—both universities and think-tanks—and operational agencies. 
Consequentialist Ethics 
At bottom, the change in culture requires recognizing a single first-order 
principle—the sanctity of life or human dignity—but relegating the three 
operational ones that form the core of traditional humanitarian culture—
independence, neutrality, and impartiality—to second-order status. They are 
means, not ends; they may be helpful but are not moral absolutes. They necessarily 
take a backseat to more consequentialist calculations about specific inputs based 
on better knowledge about specific armed conflicts and their likely operational 
outcomes and impacts. 
The age of innocence, if there ever was one, is over (see Weiss 1999; Wood, 
Apthorpe, and Borton 2001). Instead of rushing, humanitarians urgently need to 
slow down and move beyond the dominant cultural trait of ‘we need immediate 
action’ (Levine and Chastre 2004: 19). Wars are not tsunamis or earthquakes, and 
humanitarians should approach them differently. The required cultural change is 
dramatic: to navigate the shoals of the troubled waters in contemporary war zones, 
humanitarians must reflect before acting. ‘The remedy is a more thoroughgoing 
pragmatism,’ David Kennedy (2005) suggests. ‘By rooting out bias, disenchanting 
the doctrines and institutional tools which substitute for analysis, insisting on a 
rigorous pragmatic analysis of costs and benefits, we might achieve a 
humanitarianism which could throw light on its own dark sides.’ 
Thoughtful and informed strategic humanitarianism is more appropriate than the 
rigid application of traditional, second-order principles for at least four reasons: 
Goals often conflict. Good intentions can have catastrophic consequences. Ends can 
be achieved in multiple ways. And choices are necessary even if the options are less 
than ideal. 
Humanitarians should thus set aside ideology, weigh alternatives, and consider 
longer-term outcomes. In short, judgments should not be derived a priori from 
second-order principles. Empirical assessments are essential because the darker 
sides of virtue can overwhelm the benefits of humanitarianism; the availability of 
resources is an insufficient argument for action. There are always winners and 
losers, virtuous outcomes and horrendous costs. Humanitarianism provides an 
idealistic vocabulary and institutional machinery; but it should be judged by 
consequences and not intentions, by the quality of results and impacts and not 
merely inputs and outputs. 
It would be unfair and inaccurate to imply that nothing has changed in the post-
Cold War era. Efforts over the last two decades point to a gradually increased 
appetite among practitioners for social science research. Oxfam-UK has long led 
the way with paid staff for research and evaluation. Seasoned observers are 
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familiar with the ICRC’s Avenir efforts, the International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies’ Sphere Project, and the Active Learning for 
Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP). Research from 
the Humanitarianism & War Project (first at Brown and later Tufts University), the 
Overseas Development Institute, Global Humanitarian Assistance, and the Centre 
for Humanitarian Dialogue along with university researchers in many other places 
have helped generate data and metrics.  
A significant indication of the need for changing the dominant culture was the 
Emergency Capacity Building Project (ECB), a decade-long effort financed mainly by 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.7 In 2004 the emergency directors from 
seven of the largest NGOs—CARE International, Catholic Relief Services, 
International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps, Oxfam GB, Save the Children and 
World Vision International—focused on persistent challenges. An initial ECB report 
on capacity identified key gaps constraining the ability to provide timely, effective, 
and quality responses. Between 2005 and 2013, 20 publications (both research and 
guides) resulted. 
Better information and base-lines certainly are a step in the right direction, but 
successful learning requires not only diagnoses and prescriptions (by outsiders and 
insiders) but implementation. Yet the dominant culture of humanitarian agencies 
resists cures for what ails the system. Three well placed analysts note that since the 
trauma of Rwanda, ‘the humanitarian sector has witnessed an (incomplete) trend 
toward professionalization’ (Dijkzeul, Hilhorst, and Walker 2013: s4).8 
‘Incomplete’ is indeed a generous depiction. As a result of their frenzied fervor to 
react to crises and  strong  commitment to saving strangers, humanitarian 
organizations devote far too little energy and far too few of their own 
discretionary resources to understanding the nature of a particular disaster and 
tailoring their responses accordingly. Doing something or doing nothing may be 
acceptable options. What Larry Minear and I wrote two decades ago retains 
salience: ‘Don’t just do something, stand there’ (Minear and Weiss 1993). Reflection 
is required as a prerequisite for action and will amortize investments better than 
hasty reactions however heartfelt and well-intentioned. 
Whereas ‘humanitarian’ has the tone of selfless caring, ‘strategic’ has the ring of 
cold-hearted calculation, at least in too many humanitarian ears. Strategic thinking 
is not merely for specialists in foreign policy or international security but for 
humanitarians as well. Strategic thinking would be amortized by strategic doing. 
Saving lives is a not only a question of the heart but also of the mind. Tempering 
idealism with improved analytical capacities will enhance the tensile strength of 
the international humanitarian system, an approach that the late Myron Wiener 
(1998) long ago dubbed ‘instrumental humanitarianism.’ 
Evidence-based humanitarian action must also be context-driven. Social science 
can be helpful in tailoring activities to local sensitivities and in monitoring ongoing 
operations. Alternative sources should be drawn on, including journalists who may 
have access to political leaders and politically marginal and neglected areas, or 
truck and taxi drivers who have insights into local logistics. The participation by 
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 8 The authors are guest editors for a special issue devoted to this topic. 
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users and target groups is part of an essential partnership in research (Hammond 
2008). 
Practitioners should be more receptive toward social science whose strength is 
its ability to gather, organize, interpret, and disseminate evidence-based and 
context-driven findings, policy recommendations, and tailored guidelines. This 
recommendation is not a self-serving justification by a researcher but a conviction 
that more reflection and less reaction would not only help improve the efficiency 
of the humanitarian enterprise but also better assist vulnerable populations.  
Over a decade ago Larry Minear (2002: 7) argued that ‘humanitarian 
organizations’ adaptation to the new realities has been for the most part lethargic 
and phlegmatic.’ Humanitarians still are learning disabled—they possess neither 
the capabilities nor cultural inclinations to process information, correct errors, and 
devise alternative strategies and tactics. Delivery and protection, not analysis, 
properly preoccupy them, but aid officials should recognize the value-added of 
social scientists. A partnership would be beneficial for aid agencies and academics 
as well as the denizens of war-torn societies. 
Part of changing the dominant humanitarian culture will involve the humanitarian 
equivalent of military science. For too long, aid workers have talked about 
becoming more professional but have been unwilling to accept the discipline and 
costs that necessarily would follow.9 While data and research are more prevalent 
than in the early post-Cold War period, too much relief and protection is driven by 
anecdote and Angst, by intuition and instinct rather than by evidence, strategy, and 
outcomes.  Seed money from the Gates Foundation and other donors is welcome 
and helpful, to be sure, but agencies themselves should devote more core 
resources to improving their knowledge base and training staff.  
While humanitarians will undoubtedly bristle at the comparison, professional 
militaries—unlike professional humanitarians—have a culture that values learning 
and invests substantial human and financial resources in the institutional 
infrastructure to assemble and act on lessons. Military academies epitomize how 
this works; previous and on-going operations are dissected, new procedures are 
tried and tested, and student-soldiers are educated about best practices and 
adapting tactics to field specifics. Career development requires time-off for study 
and reflection before new assignments. Ongoing operations have historians. While 
critics could ridicule these orientations as a result of institutional ‘fat’ and overly 
generous allocations from parliaments, they are better viewed as an essential 
cultural difference that humanitarians should emulate. It is overly simplistic to 
summarily dismiss the military for fighting the last war. They devote substantial 
professional energies to learning lessons; humanitarians virtually never do but 
sprint to the next emergency.  
 
Humanitarian culture should switch from reaction to reflection-and-action, from 
being not simply strong and sincere but also smart. The trademark of 
humanitarians is responding from the heart. However, an equal dose of well-
informed tough-mindedness is required. Why? Humanitarian personnel are specific 
targets of warring parties; insignia no longer afford protection; and emergency 
                                                          
 9 For a discussion of internal clashes, including among founding and subsequent generations, 
see Vallaeys 2004; and Hopgood 2005. 
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responses are but one element of complicated processes of conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding. With humanitarians competing on two fronts—for resources from 
donors and for access from belligerents—they also should devote more energy to 
thinking about goals and roles, ends and means, results and impacts; and to 
pursuing new strategies, tactics, and tools for contemporary wars.  
Reconsidering independence, impartiality, and neutrality has led to a collective 
identity crisis. In an increasingly competitive marketplace, the proposition here is 
straightforward: those who are clear about the costs of deviating from guiding 
principles will be more successful in helping affected populations than those with 
no principles (opportunists) or with inflexible ones (ideologues). 
Modesty is a virtue for aid workers and social scientists. Yet many of the most 
committed humanitarians would have us believe in the humanitarian ‘imperative’ 
(see Weiss, forthcoming 2015), the moral obligation to treat affected populations 
similarly and react to every crisis consistently. No two crises are the same, however, 
and this notion flies in the face of politics, which consists of drawing lines as well as 
weighing options and limited resources to make tough decisions about doing the 
greatest good or the least harm because there invariably will be more humanitarian 
demand than supply. 
A more accurate description of coming to the rescue in today’s wars would be the 
humanitarian ‘impulse’—sometimes we should and can act, and sometimes we can 
but should not.  Humanitarian action is desirable, not obligatory. The humanitarian 
impulse is permissive; the humanitarian imperative is peremptory. Altering the 
slope of the curves for demand and supply necessitates hard-headed analysis and 
not the rigid application of moral absolutes. Although fashionable, one 
humanitarian size, particularly as it was tailored from the cloth of a different epoch, 
no longer fits. 
Frequently, the word ‘dilemma’ is employed to describe painful decision-making, 
but the word ‘quandary’ is more apt. A dilemma involves two or more alternative 
courses of action with unintended, unavoidable, and equally undesirable 
consequences. If consequences are equally unpalatable, remaining on the sidelines 
is a viable and moral option. Humanitarians find themselves perplexed, or in a 
quandary, but they are not and should not be immobilized by contemporary wars. 
The key lies in making a good-faith effort to analyze the advantages and 
disadvantages of any military or civilian course of action and opt for what may be 
the least-worst option.  
The calculations are agonizing but inescapable for those working in today’s 
humanitarian business. The cost of spurning lessons is more than the expense of 
learning them. Consequentialist ethics are essential. 
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Conclusion 
Approaching contemporary humanitarian action as a deeply militarized and 
politicized activity that is also commercial will be scandalous to those who see a 
healing profession based exclusively on values and principles. Most people become 
humanitarians or donate to aid agencies because they care about alleviating 
suffering, not because they want to be involved in military and political 
manipulation or make a profit. But it is myopic to ignore the military and political 
overlay of contemporary efforts in war zones and the market dynamics of the 
multibillion dollar business—supply, demand, competition, market distortions, 
monopolies, cost, price, efficiencies, and investor bias influence how money flows 
in emergencies, and how aid agencies respond.  
Militarization, politicization, and marketization are not the whole truth of the 
humanitarian project, but they are essential components.  It is crucial to understand 
how the international humanitarian system functions if one hopes to improve its 
operations and attenuate, if not eliminate, the culture of competition and counter-
productivity. Evidence-based and context-driven social science can ameliorate the 
performance of the humanitarian enterprise.  The culture should move away from 
input- and output-based decisions towards outcomes and impacts. The 
transformation of war and the marketplace requires the transformation of 
humanitarianism as well. 
Politicization no less than militarization calls into question the independence, 
neutrality, and impartiality that previously were the solid foundations for 
humanitarian culture and action. These two factors alone would have undermined 
the dominant, traditional humanitarian culture.  But the third and less obvious 
influence, the humanitarian marketplace, combines with the other two so that 
today’s war zones are distinctly different from earlier ones. Humanitarianism ain’t 
what it used to be, but it could approach its lofty ideals if strategic-thinking were 
routinely a prelude to strategic-doing. 
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Rethinking the Limits of the Humanitarian 
Emergency Paradigm: Response to Tom Weiss  
 
David Chandler (University of Westminster) 
Introduction 
In the 1990s, the end of the Cold War heralded the birth of international 
‘humanitarian’ intervention, thus blurring the lines between political, military and 
ethical spheres of policy-making. Intervention was conceived of as a necessary 
exception to the norms of international politics, justified by ‘emergencies’, which 
threatened the peace and security of international society itself (Chesterman 
2002). This emergency framing was central to the ontology of humanitarian 
intervention: firstly, because intervention as emergency was understood as an 
exception; and, secondly, because, in these exceptional circumstances, intervention 
was legitimised by assumptions of the superior knowledge and resources of the 
policy-intervener. The ‘emergency’ framework was therefore heavily reliant on 
modernist assumptions that knowledge and power operated in universal, linear and 
reductionist ways.  
It was believed that humanitarian and human rights interventions, even including 
regime change and post-conflict management, could be successful on the basis 
that a specific set of policy solutions could solve a specific set of policy problems. 
This framework of intervention reached its apogee in international state-building in 
the Balkans, with long-term protectorates established over Bosnia and Kosovo, and 
is reflected in the RAND Corporation’s reduction of such interventions to simple 
cost-benefit formulas that could be universally applied (Dobbins et al. 2007). This 
set up a universalist understanding of good policy making—the idea that certain 
solutions are timeless—like the rule of law, democracy and markets. 
This universalist, linear and reductionist approach to emergency intervention 
assumed that international intervention was the prerogative of leading Western 
states and that Western international specialists had the knowledge, technology 
and agency necessary to fix the problems. The militarization, politicization and 
marketization of humanitarianism, flagged up by Tom Weiss in his paper, should 
therefore be understood in this context. The coercive politicization of 
humanitarianism—the ‘humanitarian militarism’ of the 1990s (Chomsky 1999)—was 
not necessarily an oxymoron, but, in fact, highlighted a crucial aspect of continuity 
in the production of the binary divide between the subject and object of 
intervention and the asymmetrical assumptions behind the role and duties, power 
and knowledge of policy-interveners and the capacities and rights of those subject 
to emergency policy-intervention. 
Today, as Tom Weiss succinctly puts it, in his very useful paper, ‘humanitarians no 
longer are on the side of the angels’. Something seems to have gone wrong with 
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the humanitarian intervention paradigm, so that ‘their motivations and mastery, 
their principles and products are questioned from within and from without’. The 
issue at stake is the analysis of this sea-change in understanding. Whilst Weiss 
argues that the problems can be addressed through an increased 
professionalization of humanitarian actors, in my response, I will seek to draw out 
the broader shifts in both policy practices and conceptual discourses, which reflect 
much deeper ontological concerns over the traditional hierarchical models of 
power and linear epistemes of knowledge presupposed by the humanitarian 
emergency paradigm and which go entirely unchallenged in his discussion of it. 
Epistemological Limits  
In Weiss’s analysis, the problem is essentially one of epistemology: the need to 
acquire more and better forms of knowledge in order to make humanitarian 
intervention more efficient in terms of consequentialist outcomes. According to his 
analysis, humanitarianism has been too politically and strategically naïve. As we 
know, ‘the road to Hell is often paved with good intentions’: good intentions can 
easily lead to bad outcomes in a world of contestation and conflict. However, there 
is little that is new in the critique of humanitarianism for being precisely what it is 
not: a politically strategic form of intervention, concerned with ends rather than 
means.  
This, of course, is why the critique sounds plausible and why it has been argued 
many times before. As Weiss powerfully restates the problem, humanitarianism has 
been too easily turned into a fungible resource: used by Western governments to 
promote military adventurism or to buy allies; used by warlords and dictators to 
shore up their political authority; and turned into a multi-billion dollar business 
sector by the aid industry with its media marketing and fund-raising. The history of 
humanitarianism appears to be full of the unintended consequences which occur 
when universal desires to ‘help the helpless’ meet the concrete realities of power 
inequalities and desperation. 
The solution Weiss proposes is to ‘skill-up’ humanitarianism by giving it a new 
ethical framework and arming it with the latest in scientific social understandings. 
Rather than starting with the de-ontological ethics of Jean Henri Dunant and the 
Red Cross—operating in a ‘humanitarian space’ supposedly immune from power 
and politics and assisting all in need regardless of their aims and affiliations—
‘consequentialist’ ethics can help to ensure that the outcomes are positive ones 
and that the right people will be assisted in making the right choices. Out (or rather 
relegated to ‘second order status’) go ‘independence’, ‘neutrality’ and ‘impartiality’ 
and in comes rigorous cost-benefit analysis. Consequences and the quality of 
outcomes should count, not ‘good intentions’.  
This is a call for the professionalization of the aid industry. Thus, ‘skilled-up’ 
humanitarianism can be less passionate and more intelligent, focusing on strategic 
learning and the development of analytical capabilities. While Weiss dislikes the 
militarization, politicization and marketization of humanitarianism, it seems that 
humanitarians can only compete and hold their own separate ‘space’ by taking up 
the professionalised and dispassionate learning and organisational cultures of 
these other sectors. 
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In my view, analyzing the ‘humanitarian crisis’ as a problem of knowledge and its 
application—as an epistemological problem—has counterproductive results. 
Firstly, I feel that it is far too dismissive and disparaging of the humanitarian field 
for its alleged lack of capacities and cultural problems. The idea of ‘learning 
disabled’ humanitarianism can come across as just the sort of patronizing ‘ivory 
tower’ analysis that does little good when it comes to bridging gaps between 
academia and the field. Secondly, it is far too dismissive of the humanitarian ethos, 
tradition and principles themselves. I do not think that throwing out the principled 
de-ontological ethics of helping on the basis of human needs, rather than strategic 
outcomes, is likely to reclaim an ethical space for humanitarian action.  
More to the point, the passion to assist others and to envisage social change and 
transformation is sadly missing in today’s world. To remove the voluntarist ‘naivety’ 
of humanitarian activism and replace it with dispassionate cost-benefit analysis on 
the basis of possible short-term and long-term consequences is thereby unlikely to 
revive the humanitarian ethos. In our current climate, of ‘worst-case’ scenarios, risk-
averseness and precautionary policy-making, the desire to galvanise 
humanitarianism on the basis of (an impossible) 20-20 future vision and to hold 
humanitarians responsible for the future acts and indirect consequences of their 
assistance is, in fact, more likely to put the final nail in the coffin of the 
humanitarian spirit. 
Ontological Limits  
The problem with Weiss’s analysis is that it underestimates the broader problems 
underlying the moral crisis of international humanitarianism. I do not think that the 
crisis of humanitarianism is a problem generated or determined by the lack (or 
presence) of correct capacities and learning cultures in the humanitarian field itself. 
In fact, there is a danger that the argument becomes rather insular—as if the moral 
crisis of humanitarianism was a problem of humanitarianism per se, rather than a 
reflection of the broader crisis of ‘policy intervention’ regardless of the policy actor 
or the field of policy concern. Unfortunately, placed in the larger context, it 
becomes clear that this crisis cannot be solved by ‘skilling-up’ policy interveners in 
the framework suggested by Weiss and others.  
Increased professionalization and less passion and commitment are unlikely to 
help humanitarians deal with the problem of the unintended consequences of 
intervention in a complex and interconnected world, which seems much less 
amenable to traditional projections of power and policy-influence (Naim 2013; 
Ramalingam 2013). If Western militaries and Western governments, with all their 
alleged organisational learning skills, are seen as incapable of international 
intervention without creating problematic unintended consequences, it is clear 
that this approach cannot assist humanitarian actors facing exactly the same 
criticisms of their moral authority to intervene. 
The humanitarian industry is caught up in much broader shifts in how state-
society relations and social and political ‘problem-solving’ are understood to work. 
And these shifts indicate a shift away from the internal focus on organisational 
professionalism, learning cultures and capacities and instead a greater relational 
engagement with the societies and communities being governed or intervened in. 
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This relational engagement does not just mean interveners knowing more about 
the local context or enhanced ‘knowledge of local societies and languages’ as 
suggested in Weiss’s paper. These shifts, in fact, challenge the ontological 
assumptions upon which he sets out the problems of humanitarian intervention 
and its alleged modes of resolution.1 
We are witnessing nothing less than a revolution in international policy-thinking, 
with a shift from imagining that international policy-makers or humanitarian 
agencies can solve problems through the provision of knowledge or resources or 
the export or transfer of policy practices (or even their imposition, through 
conditionality or coercion). It is increasingly understood that problems should be 
grasped as emergent consequences of complex social processes, which need to be 
worked with rather than hubristically over-ridden by external actors (Byrne and 
Callaghan 2014).  
Many critics suggest that the claims of Western knowledge and power are false 
and hubristic and that Western modernist understandings of knowledge as context 
free and universally valid are problematic (Shilliam 2011: 13). Policy-interventions 
taking an ‘emergency’ form are therefore criticised increasingly on the ontological 
grounds of complexity rather than seeking to build further upon rationalist and 
linear frameworks. Rather than articulating policy-intervention in terms of 
emergency and exception, with assumptions of external knowledge and control 
over policy outcomes, the ontological critique tends to reframe problems as 
emergent outcomes of complex processes. Crises are no longer percieved as 
discrete problems amenable to linear and reductionist policy-interventions.  
This process is well articulated by Michael Dillon, in terms of a shift in policy 
concerns from governance over territory to biopolitical concerns over the 
circulatory and contingent processes of life. For Dillon (2007:13): 
It is precisely here in the ground of life itself that contemporary 
biopolitics of security therefore intuit a pure experience of order, 
and of its mode of being, radically different from the Newtonian 
physics of a mechanistic and positivistic real that once inspired 
the west’s traditional state-centric territorial geopolitics of 
sovereign subjectivity.  
Crises are thus increasingly less likely to be construed as amenable to 
humanitarian forms of top-down understanding and emergency intervention but 
instead as complexes of interconnected processes. In this systems-perspective of 
complex processes of emergence, emergent effects cannot be governed through 
reductionist cause-and-effect understandings. Rearticulating emergencies in terms 
of emergent outcomes enables responses which no longer need to be understood 
as humanitarian exceptions. In this framing, conflict, poverty and humanitarian 
disasters become normalised rather than exceptional and instead of calling forth 
emergency responses appear to be amenable forms of policy-intervention building 
upon local responses.2  
                                                          
	 1	 See, for example, Chadwick, Debiel, and Gadinger 2013, available at: http://www.gcr21.org/ 
publications/global-dialogues/.  	
 2 See, for example, Drabek and McEntire (2003: 97–112); and Kaufmann (2013: 53–68). 
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Conclusion 
In the shift from an emergency paradigm to an emergent one, a different 
framework for understanding problems and the policy responses elicited by them 
becomes clear. The ‘emergency’ form of policy-intervention can thereby be seen as 
a coercive and top-down response articulated within a liberal modernist paradigm, 
founded upon linear and reductionist understandings of policy-intervention. The 
systems- or process-based understanding of emergence suggests that policy-
interventions need to work with rather than against organic local practices and 
understandings and suggests solutions designed to enhance autonomous 
processes rather than undermine them. These forms of intervention cannot be 
grasped within the liberal modernist paradigm central to the discourse of 
humanitarian emergency. 
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Rethinking the Limits of Humanitarian 
Critiques: Response to Tom Weiss  
 
Dennis Dijkzeul (Ruhr University Bochum) 
Introduction 
An unmarried and childless friend of mine has a magnet on her fridge that says, 
‘Once I am done raising my husband, I‘ll be a perfect mother.’ Unfortunately, raising 
husbands or becoming a perfect mother is hampered by the involvement of others 
in such efforts, who are unlikely to fully cooperate and see perfection similarly. The 
reactions by others to our behavior regularly lead to our goals being thwarted and 
unintended consequences. These dynamics of human interaction are always—but 
never in exactly the same way—extremely difficult to control; they unravel the best 
designed plans, frustrate (presumed) ideological purity, and undo principled 
approaches. Understanding these dynamics is an issue in all social sciences. 
Nevertheless striving to be a good mother or husband is still a laudable goal as long 
as one knows the limitation that one cannot impose one’s good intentions on 
others. Purity of intention does not ensure successful interaction. And raising 
husbands as a prelude to something else is a lot easier than addressing 
humanitarian crises in a truly effective manner. 
In his paper, Tom Weiss rightly challenges current humanitarian approaches and 
attempts to come up with solutions. Yet, his solutions can only partially address the 
problem of the ongoing instrumentalization of humanitarian action. 
Culture or Political Economy? 
Tom’s title focuses on the culture of the humanitarians, but his analysis is much 
broader: the political economy of humanitarian crises and its interaction with 
humanitarian action. Central to a political economy approach is the analysis of how 
various actors pursue their own—often hidden—agendas. They can use 
humanitarian action as an instrument to further their own aims. A good political 
economist is able to describe the ensuing dynamics by which a diverse set of actors 
cause unintended, often suboptimal consequences, how and why worthwhile goals 
are not met, and why people cannot live by their principles alone. Noting that 
humanitarian action becomes a fungible resource in crises, Tom Weiss masterfully 
describes three forms of such instrumentalization—politicization, militarization, 
and marketization—which increasingly complicate humanitarian action and calls 
into question traditional humanitarian principles. He does not succumb to easy 
cynicism, but based on years of experience attempts to understand crises better 
and improve how they are addressed. He prefers a humanitarian culture that is 
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more modest in its claims that it can help successfully and details two admittedly 
imperfect solutions. First, he defines what an evidence-based culture should look 
like. Second, he wants a much stronger consequentialist ethic to be followed. 
Elsewhere, he also writes about accreditation of humanitarian organizations and 
the need for consolidation of the humanitarian system (Weiss 2013). While Weiss’s 
prescriptions help deal with the shortcomings of humanitarian action, they cannot 
do so fully, because they cannot overcome the root-causes of politicization, 
militarization, and marketization. Hence, the solutions only partially address the 
problem, as they also run into the problem of the three forms of 
instrumentalization he describes. 
On Evidence 
Let’s start with a rhetorical question: did the evidence-based culture of the 
military matter for the decisions to intervene in Kosovo, Iraq, or Afghanistan?  
Obviously not, as evidence alone did not inform the political decision to intervene. 
A political process overtook the decision-making aspects of military culture. 
Leaders and decision-makers often use evidence that fits a direction usually 
decided on other grounds. Even if they would like to use evidence, it is rare that 
evidence is specific enough to be actionable. Some of the evidence to justify the 
intervention in Iraq—the presence of WMDs—was actually made up. It is not 
entirely clear how much then US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, knew or wanted 
to know about the quality of the evidence. Which other actors in the Bush 
Administration had specific interests or convictions to justify the intervention? How 
much did Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and President Bush or the CIA actually 
know that Colin Powell did not know? Which other goals did they feel they could 
realize through the intervention? Ending the unfinished work of the former Bush 
presidency, raising the Administration’s popularity, promoting Halliburton, winning 
elections, projecting an image of strong US power, or restoring justice after 9/11? 
The point is that it is not easy to come up with a clear answer. On the one hand, 
political scientists rarely to never have direct access to such decision-making. On 
the other, those involved are rarely open about all their intentions; they may have a 
hidden agenda next to their open one. 
I am not in any way negative about the potential advantages of using evidence1, 
but I am skeptical about the extent to which it can shape political or humanitarian 
decision-making. Instrumentalization of action, be it politicization, militarization, or 
commercialization, is an every-day political phenomenon. Even the solutions to this 
instrumentalization are likely to be used by actors to further their own purposes. It 
is here that humanitarian (and human) interaction become hard to track for 
scholars and practitioners alike. 
To give one example, a former head of a government agency charged with 
disaster response, said that he did not want to know everything his trusted staff or 
tested and responsible NGOs did on all occasions, because then they could 
implement their own solutions, within understood parameters and without 
                                                          
 1 See the 2013 Special Issue of Disasters on Evidence-based Humanitarian Action by Dennis 
Dijkzeul, Dorothea Hilhorst, and Peter Walker. 
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unproductive interference. He also did not tell his superiors everything he knew 
when it would only produce a round of less than useful discussion. At the same 
time, he tried to attend as many general meetings as possible: ‘to be present,’ so as 
to share in understanding the overall direction of his organization. He worked hard 
on gaining information, understanding the dynamics of political action, which 
varied in every situation, including the levers of power and how these influenced 
humanitarian action. In the process, he was sometime able to create an 
organizational space complementary with humanitarian space, but not entirely 
based on the traditional humanitarian principles—so that humanitarian action 
could proceed, responding to local circumstances, instead of primarily political 
directives. 
In sum, evidence is important. It should be used more in humanitarian circles. But 
at best it is just one aspect of political decision-making and humanitarian 
leadership. 
On Ethics 
Tom Weiss advocates a consequentialist ethic. He doubts the humanitarian 
imperative—a deontological or duty-based ethic—and wants it replaced by the 
‘humanitarian impulse’. He is even more scathing about the other three principles.  
Yet, in practice, both ethics can interact. In the eastern DRC in the late 1990s, 
there were a few organizations, such as Agro Action Allemande (Welthunger Hilfe) 
and the Life and Peace Institute that built large networks of contacts on all sides of 
the conflict, in particular, with traders that worked across battle lines, traditional 
chiefs and family members, and local officials. They then communicated and used 
the humanitarian principles in their daily activities to build trust on all sides. In 
other words, they used a deontological ethic to facilitate the impact of their work, 
implementing it in a consequentialist manner. This is not easy, but some 
organizations pull it off in the field. MSF, to give another example, is an 
organization that consciously bases itself on the principles. Yet, once it decides to 
become active somewhere it follows a rigorous decision-making approach, in which 
it focuses on its (potential) health and medical impacts. In this way, it also combines 
both ethics (Heyse 2006). 
Put differently, the two ethics are not mutually exclusive. When Weiss defends 
the consequentialist ethic, he uses the word “should” several times. Even when 
advocating a more consequentialist ethic, he does not question the practical and 
normative need for humanitarian action. His position implicitly combines both 
ethics. Yet, the difficult question when and how to combine them exactly cannot be 
answered a priori. It is always a judgment call. In the meantime, other actors—local 
or international—calculate whether they see a specific humanitarian organization 
or activity as an opportunity to grasp or a threat to suppress (DeMars 2005). And 
the humanitarian organization’s staff may not be (fully) aware of this.  
The basic image behind the consequentialist ethic is a homo economicus, who 
knows his interests (a.k.a. utilities or preferences), and is able to strategically 
calculate (all) possible consequences and select his desired option. The 
deontological ethic works with the homo sociologicus, who follows societal norms, 
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because that is the right, good, or appropriate thing to do. Yet, norms and interests 
are not separate entities. They mutually influence each other. Societal norms and 
individual interest constitute each other. Yet we rarely know how exactly. They are 
basic concepts of the social sciences that are nevertheless ill-suited to fully 
understanding the dynamics of social interaction, including its instrumentalization. 
The difficulty of understanding these dynamics was known for a long time before 
the modernist liberal interventions of the post-Cold War era.2  
For humanitarian action, focusing more strongly on the dynamics has both 
positive and negative effects. Positively, a principled approach is sometimes 
possible. It requires hard work, and may achieve positive consequences. On the 
negative side, its degree of success cannot be determined beforehand, because 
one cannot control the behavior of (all) other actors. Sometimes other actors will 
hijack humanitarian action for their own benefit. Sometimes humanitarian actors 
will save lives. Sometimes they will fail. Yet, humanitarians are rarely completely 
powerless in their reactions to these actors and often may be able to come up with 
alternative courses of action. Tom Weiss‘s text helps the humanitarians to come up 
with at least partial approaches.  
On Academic Solutions 
In sum, there is room for the humanitarian principles and the deontological ethic, 
but it is a limited one that requires continuous care (Slim 1997), as other actors will 
attempt to realize their own purposes. We do not know beforehand when the 
humanitarians or other actors will succeed. And I have not raised the question yet 
to which extent the humanitarian organizations ‘instrumentalize’ their own work. 
There is a corollary here for scholars. Once they have finally worked out all the 
strategies and tactics that the various actors use to politicize, militarize, or 
marketize aid, these actors will have moved on to their next set of strategies and 
tactics. Academic solutions frequently do not have a long half-life; they in turn can 
also be used instrumentally.  
Is there an alternative? Not really, I only have an imperfect offering: We need to 
make the problem of instrumentalization a central research object. The remarkable 
thing about humanitarian organizations is not that other actors are constantly 
attempting to instrumentalize them by attaching hidden agendas or even taking 
over their open agendas. Instead, the remarkable thing is how humanitarian 
organizations manage to elude becoming completely instrumentalized, or even 
                                                          
 2 First, take Machiavelli’s prince, not exactly a principled actor. But even if Il Principe’s use of 
norms and values is purely instrumental, the associated hypocrisy is only possible as the 
compliment that vice pays to virtue. Second, classical realists were highly skeptical of military 
interventions and foreign adventures. Their sensitivity to the tragic aspects of political 
instrumentalization and the unintended consequences of good (and bad) intentions made 
them call for prudence in international politics. Both examples show political scholars basing 
themselves on their own life’s experiences to become extremely skeptical of universalist, 
linear, reductionist, and generalizing scholarly work. David Chandler is right to protest against 
such universalist, linear and reductionist approaches. Yet, Machiavelli, the classical realists 
and Tom Weiss have attempted to deal with the complexity of the dynamics of interaction all 
along. 
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instrumentalize others (Dijkzeul 2015). We need far more empirical research on the 
ground in crises and within organizations active in them. There are ontological 
issues concerning societal change. The central problem, however, is not 
ontological, but more epistemological and methodological. First, what concepts 
(norms, interests, ethical basis of action) can we usefully apply to the study of 
humanitarian crises? Second, how do we find the time and resources, and identify 
the methods to obtain enough information on what is happening within the 
organizations, international decision-making bodies, and with other actors in a 
crisis? Only if we understand the networks of various local and international actors, 
with their open and hidden agendas, and how they try to instrumentalize aid, can 
we at least more consciously attempt to deal with humanitarian (inter-) action and 
its unintended consequences. Addressing these epistemological and 
methodological issues can also help to further determine what the most pertinent 
research questions are in this respect. Praxis and theory can be linked more closely. 
I would like to send Tom Weiss and David Chandler out into the field to carry out 
considerable empirical research. And I hope that I can go with them.  
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